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The CJCS Joint Training Program institutes methods for identifying training
requirements through review of the CINCs' missions and the compilation of Joint Mission
Essential Task Lists (JMETLs). The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) comprehensively
outlines these joint essential tasks, providing a summary of CINC Missions, Joint Tasks,
and supporting tasks.
Computer aided exercises (CAXs) are tools available for monitoring and training
staffs in these tasks. A primary goal during a CAX is to present a realistic decision
environment to the training audience in order to produce realistic results. This thesis
develops an analysis methodology for using exercise data to evaluate critical event causal
audit trails. Specific objectives are: 1) to develop methodologies to objectively analyze
the causes for critical events, and 2) to demonstrate the effectiveness of these
methodologies through the use of the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS).
This thesis develops post-exercise analysis techniques for output data and provides
a methodology for extracting appropriate data from a CAX. The results of a given CAX
will then be more compatible with additional analysis techniques, such as trend analysis,
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The Joint Training Program defined within the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) establishes a program for carrying out the joint training responsibilities of the
CJCS, the Joint Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and the CINCs' component staffs. This
program institutes a method for identifying training requirements through the review of
the CINCs missions and the compilation of essential tasks required to accomplish those
missions.
For consistency and comparability purposes, each CINC is required to develop a
Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) based on the missions and essential tasks
outlined in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) document. The CINCs are responsible
for identifying the joint tasks which are most crucial to their missions and which occur
most frequently; and identifying which tasks are in the greatest need of training.
How does a CINC go about identifying which tasks are "in the greatest need of
training?" One of the primary training tools available to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC)
for training his staff on their joint mission essential tasks is a Computer Aided Exercise
(CAX). Simply stated, the problem is that currently there is no comprehensive tool for a
CINC to use to evaluate a CAX (during or after the wargame), accurately pinpoint critical
events in any or all mission areas, then determine why these critical events occurred.
Critical events are those events of significance that singularly or in concert with a
limited number of like events could cause operational and/or strategic level consequences.
The question of why the critical event occurred is of great importance, and the vehicle for
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ascertaining the answer is the audit trail. Audit trails are created by careful examination
and manipulation of the simulation's post-processor output. The goal is to use the output
to trace backward from the occurrence of a critical event in an attempt to discover the
causal relationships.
In order to standardize the process of tracing a critical event's audit trail, one must
have a consistent methodology that is applicable for any type of critical event. One
method that will achieve these goals is a checklist of all reasonable scenario parameters
that could affect an event. One should be able to reconstruct the ground, air and/or naval
situation of interest at any historical time during a training event. Once general questions
are posed and the relevant questions answered
,
the analyst can then, if necessary, move to
the next step of generating a set of critical event specific queries.
This type of analysis can be done using various exercise support simulations, but
the Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) is best suited for this research. JTLS is an
interactive, multi-sided, joint (air, land, sea, and special operations) and combined
(coalition warfare) constructive simulation model which is used as both a robust tool to
analyze theater level operations plans and as a vehicle to support training exercises and
seminar wargames.
Rolands and Associates Corporation (R&A), the developer of JTLS, has created a
set of routines which continually update ASCII output files with critical data during the
conduct of a JTLS exercise. These files were developed in conjunction with the UJTL
assessment effort and provide a variety of data describing engagement results, resupply,
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and a number of other characteristics. The data are chronological and serve to assist in
the identification of changes in the behavior of the units during critical events. In JTLS
Version 2.1, the data can be loaded into a Structured Query Language (SQL) based
relational database that can be queried by the analyst.
Through manipulation of this post-processor database one can begin to trace
critical event audit trails derived from the following "Gulf War-like" scenario. Iraqi forces
in this scenario have attacked across the border to Hafir-al -Batin in north central Saudi
Arabia and to the Kuwaiti border along the coast. The immediate objective was to seize
the Trans-Arab pipeline and control the flow of oil in northern Saudi Arabia.
Variations of three critical events were chosen for audit trail analysis: 1) the events
surrounding the 2/24th Mechanized Infantry's failure to follow a retreating Iraqi Madinah
division, portions of the same event as seen from an Iraqi perspective; 2) an Iraqi air
strike on the Coalition port of Dahrahn; 3) an Iranian air strike on the Coalition Carrier
Battle Group (CVBG), and a revisitation of the same event from an Iranian point of view.
Analysis showed that the Madinah Division's unimpeded withdrawal was due
primarily to the lack of Coalition intelligence assets, which hindered the 2/24th Mech's
efforts to locate Madinah. From the Iraqi perspective, the air strike on the 2/24th Mech
was very successful because the Iraqi forces were provided with intelligence from armed
reconnaissance missions seeking out the 2/24th Mech's location. The Dahrahn air strike
was a Coalition failure due to an experimental design that did not utilize Coalition air
forces or air defense capabilities in the wargame scenario. The Coalition CVBG was
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devastated by Iranian air forces because Coalition Combat Air Patrol (CAP) was
eliminated early in the scenario. From the Iranian perspective, extensive and unopposed
patrol aircraft provided CVBG position intelligence enabling accurate and efficient air
strikes.
Analysis was also performed on a similar scenario that was played out with heavy
gamer interaction. The resulting "parallel" critical events provided different causal audit
trails. In this case, the Madinah division was defeated due to: 1) the Coalition forces'
ability to constantly track the Madinah' s location, and 2) the aggressive tactics of the
players involved. A parallel Iraqi air strike on the port of Dahrahn was very successful
due to: 1) the players inability to properly create effective Combat Air Patrols, and 2) the
limited number and capabilities of Dahrahn' s organic air defense assets.
xvi
I. INTRODUCTION
It is far cheaper in the long run, and far safer, to pay the price that readiness requires - even in
this safer world that our past efforts have made possible. [Ref. 1]
A. BACKGROUND
In peacetime, military professionals must acquire the skills and develop the
confidence and initiative necessary to conduct joint and combined operations. While
professional schools are fundamentally important, the military is a hands-on profession and
most learning at all levels is accomplished while participating in unit training and
operations Hence, realistic, demanding, and objectively measured training and exercises
are essential. The Joint Training Program defined within the Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy 26 (MOP 26) establishes a program for carrying out
the joint training responsibilities of the CJCS, the Joint Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs),
and the CINCs' component staffs. MOP 26 institutes a method for identifying training
requirements through the review of the CINCs mission and the compilation of essential
tasks required to accomplish that mission. Each compiled task list is called the CINCs
Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).
A CINCs JMETL is intended to provide the basis for all joint training. A JMETL
consists of those tasks deemed essential for accomplishment of operational plans; it is
predicated on the missions assigned and forces apportioned to the CINC, U.S. alliances or
treaties, or regional initiatives. A JMETL includes Joint Mission Essential Tasks,
supporting tasks considered essential for accomplishment of the Joint Mission Essential
Tasks, and enabling tasks.
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The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), a supplement to the Joint Training Manual
(MCM 71-92), outlines a comprehensive list ofjoint essential tasks [Ref. 2]. As displayed
in Figure 1, that document provides:
• a summary listing of CINC Missions.
• a list of Joint Tasks, the corresponding Supporting Tasks, and their Enabling
Tasks.
• a detailed dictionary of the Joint Tasks, Supporting Tasks, and the Enabling
Tasks, describing each task in detail.
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Figure 1. Universal Joint Task List Diagram.
For consistency and comparability purposes, each CINC is required to develop a
JMETL based on the missions and essential tasks outlined in the Universal Joint Task List
document. The CINCs are responsible for identifying their major missions from the
summary listing, mapping the major missions to the joint tasks, determining the joint tasks
which are most crucial to their missions and which occur most frequently, and finally
identifying which tasks are in the greatest need of training.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
How does a CINC go about identifying which tasks are "in the greatest need of
training?" In addition to subjective post-exercise commentary, a complementary,
objective set of MOEs are needed to quantitatively evaluate staff performance in all
potential Joint Mission Essential Tasks. One of the primary training tools available to a
CINC for training and evaluating his staff in this regard is an exercise supported by a
computer simulation model. This is commonly referred to as a Computer Aided Exercise
(CAX). A primary goal during a CAX is to present a realistic decision environment to the
training audience in order to produce realistic results.
Although CAXs have proved to be an essential training tool for a CINC and his
staff, until recently there have been few methodologies available to quantitatively evaluate
the results of the CAX in a manner that lends itself to be applied across all CAXs. It has
been, at best, an ad-hoc process.
The research efforts of Combs [Ref. 3], Towery [Ref. 4], Brown [Ref 5], Mustin
[Ref 6], Cwick [Ref. 7], Sullivan [Ref. 8], Thurman [Ref. 9], and Gordon [Ref. 10]
developed individual methodologies and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to quantify
and evaluate the performance of a CINC's staff in separate and distinct mission areas.
These theses covered the topics of logistics support, intelligence functions, operational
maneuver, carrier battle group anti-air warfare, amphibious logistics, mobilization
planning, force protection, and operational firepower, respectively. Given these tools, a
CINC can begin to identify reasons why an exercise produced a given outcome in a given
mission area. These methodologies assist in locating critical events in a scenario that
significantly contribute to its outcome. There still exists the problem of formulating
comprehensive MOEs to evaluate his staffs overall performance in all mission areas.
Simply stated, the problem is that currently there is no comprehensive tool for a
CINC to use to analyze a CAX (during or after a wargame), accurately pinpoint critical
events in any or all mission areas, then determine why these critical events occurred. This
thesis will provide analysts with that comprehensive tool.
C. THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter II describes the proposed analysis methodology used to assess staff
performance. The presented methodology focuses on the analysis of significant events that
occur during an exercise. Chapter III applies the methodology to a typical exercise
scenario using JTLS. This chapter discusses the data manipulation necessary for post
exercise analysis using an existing computer simulation, the background of the combat
scenario used for this project, and the background of each selected critical event that will
be audited. Chapter IV develops the actual causal audit trails for each example event.
Chapter V uses the same methodology to analyze the outcome of a JTLS version 2.
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demonstration scenario. Chapter VI summarizes the methodology and provides
recommendations for further refinements and analysis.

II. METHODOLOGY
We owe the men and women who may be in harm's way every edge technology can provide.
Technology will never be a substitute for courage or human toughness in conflict, but it can
increase the likelihood that the tough and courageous will be successful. [Ref. 11]
A. CRITICAL EVENTS
Critical events are those events of a momentous nature that singularly or in
concert with a limited number of like events could cause operational and/or strategic level
consequences. Some examples of events of this nature might be the defeat of a tank
battalion, the destruction of a forward deployed ground unit, or the completion of a
successful reconnaissance mission.
Given the stochastic nature of a CAX, it is possible for critical events to occur at
any point in the scenario. Because a CAX is a training tool for the CINC, the question of
why the critical event occurred is of great importance. The vehicle for ascertaining the
answer is the audit trail. Audit trails are created by careful examination and manipulation
of the simulation's post-processor output. The goal is to use the output to trace backward
from the occurrence of a critical event in an attempt to discover the causal relationships.
Currently, the only capabilities investigators have in developing the audit trail are
quantitative items such as the exact time, place and strength of a unit where the critical
event occurred. If all logically required assets are present and functioning at the time of
the critical event, then it might be said that the event occurred due to the stochastic nature
of the model. This is the realism imparted by stochastic models. For example, a Patriot
defense system may be on station; however, Scuds may still penetrate the air defense
envelope. Any enemy threat for which adequate preparation has apparently been made
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still has a positive probability of defeating the planned defense, regardless of the level of
preparation. This type of critical event is well explained through audit trail analysis. The
situation gets more difficult to evaluate when pieces seem to be missing from the puzzle.
If, for instance, a major supply depot is destroyed by undetected enemy air forces and it is
subsequently discovered, via the audit trail, that the depot was virtually unprotected, the
CINC will want to know why.
The nature of combat is such that the most seemingly trivial events can eventually
have significant ramifications. The smallest details in combat contribute to the occurrence
of each event, and compounding these events leads to a cascading effect that may, in turn,
become a critical event. It is beyond the scope of plausible audit trail analysis to consider
every event of each battlefield entity, but it is possible for the true cause of a campaign's
outcome to be masked by these details. The quantitative nature of current audit trail
analysis makes it possible to answer the question ofwhy various events took place only to
a reasonable level of detail. In the context of the supply depot example above, the analyst
may discover that there was an air defense unit which was not located close enough to the
supply depot. The question ofwhy the unit was not close enough to provide sufficient
defense still remains, and this question can be answered only to the level of detail that the
available data support.
B. QUERY TEMPLATE
In order to standardize the process of tracing a critical event's audit trail, one must
have a consistent methodology that is applicable for any definable type of critical event.
8
One method that will achieve these goals is a checklist of all reasonable scenario
parameters that could affect an event. One should be able to reconstruct the ground, air
and/or naval target situation at any historical time during a training event. By using the
following checklist of general questions in the same manner for every possible critical
event, the causal relationships may gradually become more evident, allowing for the next
phase of the analysis.
• Time and location: When did the critical event occur, and what were the
locations of all involved units and/or targets?
• Force strength: What are the force strengths of the participating units in the
critical event? Are any reasonably too low? Do any of the participating units
have key combat systems casualties?
• Environmental conditions: Did weather, visibility conditions, or terrain hamper
or overly assist any participating units in accomplishing their given missions?
• Command and control issues: Were units on both sides able to communicate?
Were any participating units given multiple tasking or possibly confusing
orders?
• Logistics: Were there any supply shortfalls? Were they due to a lack of or a
misallocation of assets?
• Intelligence: Were there any intelligence shortfalls? Were they due to a lack of
or a misallocation of assets?
• Subjective issues: Did this critical event happen due to an unexplained
miscalculations or an error in a commander's judgment, or due to chance?
Once these questions are posed and the relevant questions answered , the analyst
can then, if necessary, move to the next step of generating a set of critical event specific
queries, as exemplified in Chapters III, IV, and V.
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III. JTLS APPLICATION
A. JOINT THEATER LEVEL SIMULATION (JTLS)
One of the factors involved in the development of a computer aided exercise is
selection of the appropriate software model, or exercise driver. The selection of the
model is often driven by the objectives of the training exercise. Each model has its own
operating characteristics in terms of what can be represented, method of presentation, and
level of detail and fidelity.
The Joint Theater Level Simulation is an interactive, multi-sided, joint (air, land,
sea, and special operations) and combined (coalition warfare) constructive simulation
model which is used as both a robust tool to analyze theater level operations plans and as
a vehicle to support training exercises and seminar wargames. JTLS strives to model
conflict at the operational level with tactical fidelity. Additionally, JTLS maintains a
complete suite of documentation encompassing all functional areas and describing how
they interact throughout the game. The following list of parameters describe the
capabilities and limitations ofJTLS [Ref. 12]:
Span: Defense Mapping Agency's nearly universal digitized maps and terrain data
permit the model to be used worldwide. The Terrain Modification Unit (TMU), a JTLS
software tool, can be used to built terrain files to support the JTLS model. Current map
surface area is based on a Lambert conformal projection and, hence, constrained only by
the lack of resolution that occurs with ranges larger than approximately 2000 NM on each
side.
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Environment: The terrain database for an exercise divides the area of operation
into contiguous hexagons. JTLS aggregates the terrain within a hex in terms of
environmental characteristics such as basic terrain type, trafficability, elevation, chemical
or nuclear contamination and weather. Roads connect hex centers; railroads and pipelines
are mapped via independent node to node networks; and rivers, shorelines and other
impediments to movement (such as ditches) map to hex borders.
Force Composition: JTLS is designed for multi-sided coalition warfare with air,
land, sea and special operations forces. It also models civilian and non-combatant forces
within sectors of interest. Forces can be positioned on up to ten sides and divided into an
unlimited number of factions on any side. Units can change factions during the game and
factions can change sides. Side and faction names are user-configurable via the database.
Scope of Conflict: JTLS is a "big picture" wargame that focuses on conventional
and coalition operations at the operational level of war. It supports limited nuclear and
chemical effects, dynamic coalition development, designation of political or military
factions, setting Rules of Engagement (ROE), executing Host-Nation Support
agreements, conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and operational
conflict.
The JTLS Combat Events Program (CEP) uses the SEMSCRIPT programming
language to support the need for a discrete time simulation. Most of JTLS' interfaces and
support tools programs are written in the C language. The advantage of discrete time
simulation is the ability to model activities that potentially lead to critical events. The key
processes of theater level conflict are most easily visualized as a collection of discrete
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(key) events. The collection of these events takes time to occur and potentially change the
state of systems.
Rolands and Associates Corporation, the developer of JTLS, has created a set of
routines which continually update ASCII output files with critical data during the conduct
of a JTLS exercise. These files have been developed in conjunction with the UJTL
assessment effort and provide a variety of data describing engagement results, resupply,
and a number of other characteristics. The JTLS JMET output files for a run of JTLS
comprise the input to the relational database for subsequent data retrieval. JTLS version
2.1 employs the ORACLE Relational Database Management System (RDBMS).
B. DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS
A successful database design incorporates user requirements of storing and
retrieving data into a flexible architecture that allows for efficient execution and future
modification. The end product becomes a self-describing collection of integrated records
[Ref. 13].
Relational database designs require transformation of semantic objects to facilitate
platform implementation. The formal definition explains the semantic object as a "named
collection of attributes that sufficiently describes a distinct identity." [Ref. 14] Each
attribute has a range of possible values called a domain. The domain may be numeric,
string or enumerated. To this end, a relation, or two-dimensional table, containing data is
developed from a semantic object. The semantic object model provides the most flexible
approach to modeling new database applications. Not only is the model easier to develop,
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it? is more readily implemented on a variety of platforms. Also, in terms of "life cycle"
design, a semantic model allows for rapid and easy future modification. Relational tables
are defined by their columns; data are then stored as rows in the table. A sample table
structure is shown in Figure 2.
By creating several tables of interrelated information, more complex and powerful
operations may be performed. The power of the database lies in the relationships that
can be constructed between the pieces of information, rather than in the pieces of
information themselves.
Tables can be related to each other via three types of relationships: one-to-one,
one-to-many, and many-to-many. In a (1 : 1) relationship, the tables share a common
primary key. A primary key is the column or set of columns that makes each record in a
table unique. Consider thefictional example of the TANKS table from Figure 2.
Column Names











Figure 2. Example of table structure.
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TANKS is the object being represented. TANKNUMBER is the object identifier; it is a
Key attribute that uniquely identifies an instance of the object. What if an additional
column, TIME_IN_SERVICE, were to be added to the data being stored? Since each
tank will have its own number indicating days in service, the TIME_[N_SERVICE
column should be stored in the TANKS table. However, this will force the database to
read through the entire data type value every time the table is queried, even if only the
field containing the time information is being sought. To improve performance, a second
table can be created, called TANKS_TIME_IN SERVICE This table will have the
same primary key (TANK_NUMBER), and one additional column
(TIME_IN_SERVICE). The two tables thus have a 1 : 1 relationship. This is shown
graphically in Figure 3. The solid line between the two entities indicates the relationship is
y / /
TANKS TANKS_TTME_IN_SERVICE /
Figure 3. Entity relationship diagram for a 1:1 relationship.
mandatory. Had the relationship been optional, it would have been represented with a
dashed line.
One-to-one relationships are rare. It is far more common for a relationship to be
of the one-to-many variety. In this type of relationship, one record in one table is related
to many records in another table. A foreign key is a set of columns that refers to an
existing primary key. In the TANKS table shown in Figure 2, there is only one tank per
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company. Obviously, multiple tanks are assigned to the same company. To facilitate this,
a new entity, COMPANY, would be created. The COMPANY column of the TANKS
table would then be a foreign key to this new table.
Since many tanks (records in the TANKS table) can be assigned to a single
company (record in the COMPANY table), there is a 1 :M relationship between these
tables. This is shown graphically in Figure 4. Note two differences in the connecting line:
the addition of a crow's-foot on the "many" side of the relationship, and the use of a
dashed line on the "one" side. The dashed line is used to signify that the relation is not
mandatory on that side (i.e., it is possible to have a company with no tanks assigned to it).
Generally, the transformation of 1 :M compound objects involves designating the object of
one, as parent, and the object of many, as child. When we place the key attribute of the
parent into the relation of the child, the child receives a foreign key from the parent.
It may also be possible that many rows of a table are related to many rows of
another table. Considering the TANKS table, assume that tanks may be drawn from
multiple motor pools. Conversely, a motor pool provides numerous tanks to units. Thus,
there is a many-to-many relationship between the TANKS entity and the
MOTOR_POOLS entity. To understand this relationship, note that a single tank could
be drawn from many motor pools (records in the MOTOR_POOLS table), and that the
f\k
/~ /
TANKS X COMPANY /
Figure 4. Entity relationship diagram for a 1:M relationship.
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reverse is also true. This relationship is shown in Figure 5. Many-to-many relationships
between two compound objects require three relations One relation for each object and a
third relation representing the intersection between the objects are developed for the
transformation. This third relation takes the key attributes of each object. If there are
additional data representing aspects of this relationship, then it is called an association
object. Generally, transformation of association objects requires the same process as for
compound objects. However, the child receives a foreign key from each parent in the
association object case.
Structured Query Language (SQL) is the language used to retrieve data from the
database by providing the ability to query multiple relations to extract relevant
/ / '/ /
TANKS MOTOR_POOLS /
Figure 5. Entity relationship diagram for a M:M relationship.
information. Developed in the 1970s by IBM, it is the industry standard data manipulation
language.
Relational algebra is the foundation for SQL implementation. Similar to algebra,
relational algebra treats relations as variables. There are seven primary operations in
relational algebra:
• The union of two relations adds the rows of the relations, forming a third
relation.
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• The difference between two relations produces a new relation with rows not in
the original two.
• The intersection of two relations is a third relation of rows in both original
relations.
• The product of two relations, one consisting ofm rows and the other
consisting of n rows, produces an m by n matrix relation.
• The selection operator identifies rows to be placed in a new relation.
• Projection places specified attributes from a relation into a new relation.
• Thejoin operator brings together applications of the product, selection, and
projection operations.
From the example in Figure 2, if asked to select the tank from the table TANKS
where the serial number is TB66579, the correct response would be "tank number three."
SQL code to perform the same query is: select TANK_NUMBER from TANKS where
SERIALNUMBER = TB66579
The response would be:
TANK NUMBER
This simple example serves only to emphasize the conceptual simplicity of queries
using SQL. Queries developed for this analysis, however, draw upon the more
sophisticated and significant SQL capabilities.
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C. POSTPROCESSOR CONSTRUCTION
The output data produced by JTLS 2.0 was in the form ofJMET output files or
"flat files." Each flat file was merely a collection of columns of data grouped under a
collective data file name, as exemplified in the following format for the JTLS 2.0
engagement data flat file:
engagementdata:
TEVIE.V, time of the engagement
TEXT.TYPE.ENGAGEMENT, air-to-air, surface-to-air, etc.
SHOOTER.NAME, name of the shooting unit
WEAPON.NAME, harpoon, stinger, etc.
NBR.FIRED, the number of weapons fired
TEXT.AEVLPOINT, where the weapon will land
REAL.LAT, latitude of the target
REAL.LONG, longitude of the target
TEXT.VICTIM.NAME, name of the unit whose target was hit
TEXT.TYPE.OBJECT.DAMAGED, damaged target's type (eg SAM site)
NAME.OBJECT.DAMAGED, SAM site #3, etc
AMOUNT.DAMAGED, percentage of target destroyed
PROB.KBLL, based on range, target, & weapon type
ENGAGEMENT.RANGE range of weapons release
The format of all JTLS 2.0 JMET output files can be seen in Appendix A. This format
limits the analyst in that viewing data common to more than one flat file becomes a
complicated process, necessitating data sorting and filtering algorithms. The efforts of
Brown [Ref. 5] and Mustin [Ref 6] exemplify the extensive efforts needed to transform
these data into a usable format that both the analyst and the reader can understand. Their
extensive use of Pascal sorting programs and Excel spreadsheets demonstrated that their
analyses were definitely complicated processes.
With the implementation of JTLS version 2.1, wargame data are also output in the
form of "flat files," but the content of these files is slightly augmented from its
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predecessor. The biggest difference between versions 2.0 and 2. 1 is the utilization of
these files. JTLS 2. 1 takes the data from the flat files and inputs into an ORACLE
relational database. This database creates tables for each respective mission area of
interest. The code used to produce these tables, available from the authors, shows the
sources and methods used to create each table and the resulting structure of each created
table. From theses tables, the associated ORACLE Reports software also enables
graphics and presentation packages to be developed.
D. SCENARIO REQUIREMENTS
The scenarios from which the data used in this thesis were developed were all set
in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. The standard scenario allowed for the
buildup of American forces in the region before any Iraqi incursion, typical of recent
history. The variations were developed to establish conditions for successful development
of the measures of performance in evaluating operational maneuver [Ref. 5], amphibious
logistics [Ref. 7], operational firepower [Ref. 10], carrier battle group anti-air warfare
capability [Ref 6], joint mobilization plans [Ref. 8] , and force protection [Ref. 9]. A
number of configurations were developed for the experimental runs of JTLS. These
combinations are shown in Table 1. Three different starting scenarios were investigated.
One provided for conditions which represented sufficient time for force buildup (Light).
A variation on this scenario exhibited conditions of an enemy seizure of the strategic
initiative, sufficiently degrading the ability to build combat power quickly in theater
(Heavy). The second scenario required that long distances be covered to bring forces in
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contact with the enemy. This provided for analysis of the ability, or inability, to create a
temporal advantage in less than ideal conditions. The third scenario provided for
conditions under which American Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) air defenses would be
tested by attacks from Iranian air forces.
Within each of the first two starting scenarios, a run was conducted for situations
where each side gained the operational advantage with respect to initiative. Certain key
decisions were scripted to insure that one side or the other was able to exploit an
advantage to demonstrate the effect on the measures of effectiveness dealing with the





Iraqi Initiative: Run#1 Run #3
Coalition Initiative: Run #2 Run #4
Naval Scenario: Run #5
Table 1. Experimental Run Conditions.
E. HEAVY SCENARIO
The heavy scenario was established to demonstrate the difficulty in generating
combat power and establishing a temporal advantage. The Iraqi forces in this scenario
have attacked across the border to Hafir-al -Batin in north central Saudi Arabia and to the
Kuwaiti border along the coast. The immediate objective was to seize the Trans-Arab
pipeline and control the flow of oil in northern Saudi Arabia. Force locations as Coalition
forces begin to arrive in theater are shown in Figure 6.
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The deployment sequence was formulated to allow for one brigade each from the
101
st
Airborne Division and 24 th Mechanized Infantry Division to arrive without difficulty
at a port city near the city of Dhahran. Because the database already contained United
Kingdom forces in the region, they were used to support Saudi Arabian forces in the
vicinity ofKing Khalid Military City (KKMC). Finally, the Iraqi advance along the coast
stopped short of crossing into Saudi Arabia, allowing the deployment oftwo Marine
Figure 6. Initial Force Locations at Start of Run #1 and Run #2.
Expeditionary Units into the area of Al-Khafji
1. Run #1: Heavy Scenario, Iraqi Initiative
This scenario was developed devoid of Coalition intelligence, air defense, and air
missions, thereby hampering the operations of the Coalition force. This scenario is
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designed to evaluate the Coalition response to a large Iraqi initiative without a large
massing of Coalition forces on the Iraqi border.
The conditions exhibited were of an enemy seizure of the strategic initiative,
sufficiently degrading the ability of Coalition forces to build combat power quickly in
theater. The scenario was designed so that long distances had to be covered to bring
forces in contact with the enemy. This added to the difficulty in generating combat power
and establishing a temporal advantage.
Under the conditions of Iraqi strategic initiative, forces attacked well in advance of
any Allied presence in the region. Iraqi forces secured the operational initiative by
conducting preemptive air strikes on deploying United States forces. Forces from the 2nd
Brigade of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division (2/24th Mech) were given the mission
to move west and support the defense ofKKMC. The Iraqi air and ground efforts were
designed to impede that movement.
One hour into the game the 2/24* Mech and 3 rd Brigade of the 101 st Airborne
Division (3/101 ABD ) arrived and were joined by their subordinate units. The 2/24th
Mech began moving toward KKMC, and the 3/101 ABD began to move towards Khafji
in the north. The 2/24 Mech was slowed by Iraqi air strikes as it moved west.
Coalition forces arrived into theater unhampered until 1400 on Day One, when the
port at Dhahran was hit with an aerial attack. This caused units arriving through this port
to be processed slower than usual for the next 12 hours because of the damage to the
port's Material Handling Equipment (MHE). A queue built up as units waited at the port
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to be processed. As MHE was repaired, units waiting were processed according to their
priority assigned in the Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).
Shortly into Day Two, the Iraqi 1
7
th
Armor Division began to withdraw after an
engagement with Coalition forces left them severely damaged. Two other significant
events occurred on the second day. One was closure of the 1 st Brigade of the 101 st
Airborne Division (1/101 ABD ) and 1 st Brigade of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division
(l/24th Mech) and their movement toward Khafji and KKMC, respectively. The other
was an Iraqi attack on the USMC units in the east. By midday, enough Coalition units had
arrived to begin counterattacks in the west region north ofKKMC and in the east region
near Khafji.
By the beginning of Day Three, Iraqi forces in both the east and west regions had
been damaged to the point where they began to withdraw. By midday, Coalition forces
had pushed Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and continued to pursue them until the end of the
game.
2. Run #2: Heavy Scenario, Coalition Initiative
This scenario was also developed devoid of Coalition intelligence, air defense, and
air missions, again hampering Coalition forces. This scenario was designed to evaluate the
Coalition response to a large Iraqi initiative with a large massing of Coalition forces on the
Iraqi border.
Using the same starting scenario as shown in Figure 6 and described in the
previous section, the simulation was re-scripted to include Allied command and control
decisions which demonstrated seizure of the operational initiative. Despite the initial
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posture of Iraqi forces, this scenario allows American forces to arrive in theater without
interruption and fully deploy to defensive positions by the close of Day One. Additionally,
a lack of Iraqi offensive activity allows for American air and ground attacks to initiate
action against defending Iraqi forces. The American plan was to advance the 2/24th Mech
to the same location in an attempt to build Allied combat power in that area.
The port at Dhahran was not damaged and therefore forces arriving through
Dhahran were not delayed. The Iraqi 17th Armor Division was stopped by Coalition air
attacks before it could engage Coalition forces in the west. By 1200 on Day Three,
Coalition forces began their counterattack in the north and west. By late in the day, the
Iraqi forces began to withdraw and Coalition forces pursued them with results similar to
Run#l.
F. LIGHT SCENARIO
In this scenario, the Iraqi forces have not entered Kuwait, but are only threatening
to invade. Coalition forces were able to flow into Doha, Dhahran, and King Fahd
International Airport (KFIA). At the beginning of the game, two Marine Expeditionary
Units were poised near Doha, the 3
rd
Brigade of the 101
st
Airborne Division (3/101
ABD) was moving north toward Kuwait, and the 2/24th Mech was moving west towards
KKMC. Initial force locations are shown in Figures 7 and 8.
1. Run #3: Light Scenario, Iraqi Initiative
Forces flowed into theater unhampered for the first 5 hours of the game until air
strikes again damaged port operations. The results are similar to Run #1 in that arriving
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forces were detained at the port while MHE was repaired. Iraq initiated an offensive 18
hours into the game, long before all Coalition forces had arrived in theater. The 3/101
ABD conducted a heliborne assault into northern Kuwait in an attempt to repulse the Iraqi
offensive. Coalition forces already in position, coupled with arriving Coalition forces,
were able to hold off the Iraqi attack. Iraqi forces began to withdraw between 24-30









Figure 7. Initial Force Locations near the Kuwaiti Border for Run #3 and Run #4.
2. Run #4: Light Scenario, Coalition Initiative
This scenario is very similar to Run #3 with the major difference being that the
port operations were not hampered and thus the majority of Coalition forces were able to







Figure 8. Initial Force Locations near KKMC for Run #3 and Run #4.
conducted, which allowed the Iraqi forces deeper penetration into Kuwait. Similar to Run
#3, Iraqi forces were repulsed out ofKuwait and pursued into Iraq
G. NAVAL SCENARIO
In order to assure that certain critical event types occurred, several modifications
were made to the scenario, as described in the remainder of this chapter A carrier battle
group, including a nuclear carrier (CVN), two Aegis cruisers (CGs) and other supporting
elements, was steaming in the littoral waters in the vicinity of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, as
seen in Figure 9. The Iraqis were concentrating on the ground war effort raging on the
Kuwaiti soil with the Gulf Cooperation Council and have devoted the full force of their air
assets to achieving air superiority over Kuwait. Accordingly, the CVBG was on alert
along a threat sector from 3 15T to 135T, which included the most likely avenues of attack
from the Iranian air assets at the disposal of the current military leader. The CVBG surface
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asset and CAP stationing was designed to optimize AAW capability along the expected
threat sector. The surface assets were positioned so as to roughly split the sector of
responsibility between the two Aegis cruisers and the supporting assets (Figure 9).
Known air bases exist on the coast at Bushehr and inland at Shiraz - each with aircraft





Figure 9. CVBG Stationing Assignments in the Threat Sector
Additionally, Figure 1 shows that missile sites existed on Kharg Island and that
several Iranian naval vessels were deployed from Bushehr, armed with anti-ship cruise
missiles, that were within weapons release range (WRR). The CVBG was in the Gulf to
provide support, power projection and air cover for an impending amphibious landing and
to assist in gaining and maintaining air superiority during the accompanying ground war
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maneuvers. There were three combat air patrol (CAP) stations active and the carrier air
wing was in "Alert Five" - aircraft on the deck of the carrier were prepared to launch
within five minutes - for potential air activity from the enemy. At the commencement of
the exercise, the Iranians were already declared "hostile" in a situation which allowed the
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Figure 10. Naval Scenario Force Locations
H. CRITICAL EVENT SELECTION
Critical Event One (selected from Run #1) involves the progress of the 2/24th
Mech toward the objective area. After making steady movement toward KKMC during
the first day, they were impeded by a successful Iraqi air strike at 0.625 days. Damage
was simulated and the resulting time of repair induced further delays The 2/24th Mech
eventually reached KKMC and engaged the Madinah Division in battle, but the effects of
29

this delay were not clear. Madinah Division began to withdraw from contact at day 1.15
and endured a twelve hour conflict with the 2/24th Mech during their retreat. After this,
Coalition forces lost contact with the Madinah, and the division was allowed to withdraw
unimpeded. This chain of events is the basis for Critical Event One's causal audit trail
analysis. This sequence yields an obvious question to ask Why was the Madinah
Division allowed to withdraw unimpeded?
Critical Event One (A) (also selected from Run #1) looks at a portion of the same
aspect of the scenario, but from an Iraqi perspective. How were Iraqi air forces able to
locate and hit the 2/24th Mech with the previously mentioned air strike at 0.625
days?
Critical Event Two (selected from Run #1) occurs in Dhahran, the embarkation
point for all Coalition forces and logistics arriving in the theater. Coalition forces arrived
into the theater unopposed until 1400 on Day One, when the port at Dhahran was hit with
an Iraqi aerial attack. This caused units arriving through the port to be processed slower
than usual for the next twelve hours because of the damage to the port's Material
Handling Equipment (MHE). A queue built up as units waited at the port to be processed.
As MHE was repaired, units waiting were processed according to their priority assigned in
the TPFDD. This sequence of events raises the question. Why was the Iraqi air strike
against Dhahran successful?
Critical Event Three (selected from Run #5) involves the Iranian forces'
engagement of the CVBG and represents a modification of the current "real world"
scenario. The strategy implemented by the Iranians against the U.S. Naval forces is
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saturation of AAW capability through sheer numbers and the timely coordination of both
air and cruise missile attacks by an enemy who represents neither a numerically nor
technologically advanced force.
Early destruction ofCVBG CAP aircraft and CVN, CG and DD engagement by
ship and shore based cruise missiles resulted in loss of forward air defense capabilities, the
loss of the carrier's ability to launch and recover aircraft and destruction of all escort units.
What factors enabled such horrific damage to be inflicted upon the U.S. Naval
forces?
Critical Event Three (A) (selected from Run #4) examines the naval scenario from
an Iranian point of view. The Iranian forces engaged the CVBG with a devastating air and




IV. CAUSAL AUDIT TRAIL ANALYSIS
A. SUBJECTIVITY IN ANALYSIS
In theory, the causal audit trail process can trace the causal factors from any
critical event down to the most minute detail of combat. In reality, the process' limiting
factors are a lack of significant quantitative data and the inherent difficulty in representing
subjective battlefield decisions quantitatively. The causal audit trail is best graphically
presented as a version of a "decision tree." This tree attempts to delineate all the possible
causal factors for a critical event, enabling the analyst to follow the path that leads to the
most likely cause, based on quantitative data. The branches of the tree may end when the
data required to determine the cause of a course of action is not available, or when the
analyst is faced with finding the cause of a commander's subjective decision.
The concept of being faced with a "subjective dead end" while performing
wargaming analysis is further documented by Coleman Research Corporation's (CRC)
efforts to quantitatively evaluate the entire UJTL [Ref 15]. As seen in Tables 2 and 3,
CRC concluded that of the 5199 UJTL tasks and their subordinate elements, 4571 were






Tasks 7 8 6 21
Subtasks 35 31 31 97
Supporting Tasks 136 121 136 394
Measures 1526 1865 1808 5199





Table 3. Breakdown of objective and subjective tasks.
The remaining subjective or uncertain tasks leave several aspects of combat
unmeasurable. When faced with judgments about these aspects of combat while doing a
causal audit trail analysis, one alternative is to end that portion of the causal audit trail
"tree" at the given subjective point.
Another alternative at this point of the audit trail analysis is to examine more
closely the concept of subjectivity. Currently, the only capabilities analysts have in
developing the causal audit trail are quantitative items such as exact time, place and
strength of a unit where the critical event occurred. If all logically required assets are
present and functioning at the time of the critical event, then it might be said that the event
occurred due to the stochastic nature of the model. This is the realism imparted by
stochastic models. For example, a Patriot missile battery may be on station, but Scuds
may still penetrate its defenses. Any enemy threat that is adequately defended against still
has a positive probability of defeating planned defenses.
The situation gets more difficult to evaluate when pieces seem to be missing from
the puzzle. If, for instance, a major supply depot is destroyed by undetected enemy air
and it is subsequently discovered, via the audit trail, that the depot was virtually
unprotected, the CINC will want to know why. The quantitative nature of an audit trail
provides analysts no ability to answer the question ofwhy various events took place, only
that they did. In the context of the supply depot example, the analyst can discover that
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there was an air defense unit located nearby, but not near enough to, the supply depot.
The question ofwhy the unit wasn't close enough to be effective still remains Answering
the question ofwhy during post-CAX analysis requires that the audit trail somehow be
expanded to fill in the information gap concerning the subtle reasons why various
allocations of scarce resources were made.
One possible method of filling in this information gap is through the consideration
of human factors in decision making. To review, one of the purposes of a CAX is to train
decision makers by giving them a forum in which to make decisions in as near a real
environment as can be produced. The very making of those decisions is the focus of the
subjective end of a causal audit trail. The subjectivity of an audit trail can be evaluated
only once methods are devised to gather, as unobtrusively as possible, data on why
decision makers choose one option over another.
Every decision maker has a thought process that is exercised before making a final
decision. In the context of the location of an air defenses base, the officer in charge of
locating the Patriot battery had dozens of factors influencing his final decision. Which
factors played the most important roles in his decision? Was he concerned with the
battery's tactical location? Did he feel that terrain characteristics of the location were a
factor9 Did he misinterpret his commander's orders? Did he not get enough sleep the
night before he relocated the missile battery, causing him to position it incorrectly? The
last question may seem irrelevant, but it demonstrates that almost anything could have
been the deciding factor in this decision maker's choice.
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The focus of this issue is the capturing of information that addresses these factors.
This can be attempted through several means One option is to closely observe wargame
participants and their environments in order to better judge the players' states of mind and
how these surroundings affect thought processes. Another option is to survey participants
after the wargame in order to better assess the condition under which key player
interaction decisions were made. An example of a possible survey question follows:
The commander's intent I was given is clear and allows me to make this decision
with a high degree of confidence:
(A) Strongly Agree
(B) Agree
(C) Neither Agree nor Disagree
(D) Disagree
(E) Strongly Disagree
The survey concept could be expanded to allow for input of prose if the
respondent desired. This would allow for explanation of potential problem areas. This
process could assist in finding the root causes of many critical events by analyzing critical
decisions made prior to the events. Often participants know when a scenario is not
producing favorable results, and many would value a chance to explain or justify their
actions and decisions. This approach can also have its drawbacks. Players asked to recall
the events of the game after the fact tend to exhibit a "selective" memory, heavily
influenced by the outcome of the scenario. In short, people tend to remember what they
want to remember.
In the case of the Patriot battery, the officer in charge might have liked an
opportunity to say that he was "over tasked," could not adequate defend two supply
depots, and decided to locate closer to one than the other. Finding this explanation linked
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to his last movement order would provide post-CAX analysts an ability to report why the
one supply depot was left undefended.
B. INFLUENCE OF TRAINING OBJECTIVES ON ANALYSIS
The shape and breadth of a causal audit trail are greatly influenced by the training
objectives of a wargame. For example, a CINC desiring to measure a staffs performance
of OP 6. 1 .4 (Counter Enemy Air Attack in Theater of Operations/ JOA) would
orchestrate a scenario rich in AAW units, AAW engagements, etc. The CINC would
ensure that the scenario contains a dynamic AAW element in the foreground and more
scripted representations of other areas of combat in the background. By scripting certain
combat interactions, the AAW aspects of the scenario may cause the causal audit trail to
become somewhat one dimensional.
The nature of a wargame scenario's script is influenced by more than just CINC
guidance. Scenario development is a continual process. The flexibility of large scale
exercises facilitates impromptu changes to ensure that the accomplishment of training
objectives is realized. If the decisions made by wargaming personnel are not resulting in
training objectives being met, wargame developers may change the scenario during the
exercise by altering force strengths, force deployments, etc. Thus, causal audit trail
analysis may become disjoint over the entire exercise if scenario changes are made after
exercise start.
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C. EVENT ONE: THE MADINAH WITHDRAWAL
In Brown's [Ref. 5] efforts to measure successful operational maneuver, he states
that "some method of quantifying the first order effects of operational art must be
determined." He continues to say that this representation must include more than simply
using the speed of any given combat system, or aggregation of systems. Instead, it must
be relational, taking into account the operational maneuver of both friendly and enemy
forces, as well as the descriptive characteristics of the units over time.
The need for a relational descriptive parameter led to Brown's development of a
measure of performance that is called the Fractional Closure Rate, or FCR:
DISTANCE/, e(t - At) - DISTANCE/, e(t)
FCR/.e(t) = f iy/,e,tw
MAX[DISTANCE/.e(t- At), DISTANCE/, e(t)\ J
where f= a specified friendly maneuver element or target
e= a specified enemy maneuver element or target
t= time of capture of the data
The numerator of the FCR is a representation of the closure distance between two
forces in some time interval, At, or more simply the approach velocity of two forces.
Dividing by the maximum of the current distance between forces creates a measure which
has the flexibility of demonstrating negative change in relation to the closure.
Withdrawing at a certain distance has a negative FCR of the same magnitude as an
advance at the same distance.
Brown further explains that "the Fractional Closure Rate is developed only as a
measure of performance to be incorporated into a measure of effectiveness for maneuver.
It does have some stand-alone use as a measure of effectiveness of the ability of a force to
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maintain a high operational tempo. This translates into a quantitative measure of initiative
and agility, using depth of attack as the data element. " [Ref 5]
Brown's first application of the utility of the FCR to wargaming is an analysis of
Critical Event One, the Madinah withdrawal. The progress of 2/24th Mech's movement
westward toward KKMC is exhibited in Figure 1 1, with curve behavior pointing to causal
events which impede or facilitate that progress. The trend line, shown in black, uses every
three data points to calculate a moving average, which is a characteristic representation of
the overall trends in initiative and momentum.
A slow, but successful movement toward the objective area is demonstrated by the
gradual rise in FCR from first movement until the delay caused by the Iraqi air strike at
time 0.625. Damage is simulated and the resulting time of repair induces further delays.
This, in turn, produces a drop in momentum until the completion of the first day.
Additionally, the initiation of the ground offensive by the Madinah Division creates
movement away from the 2/24th Mech's static location, further decreasing the closure.
As the damage is repaired, the closure ratio begins to increase rapidly for approximately
0.25 days, or six hours. During this time the 2/24th Mech is able to close on KKMC and
the Madinah Division, and join the battle. The more pronounced spatial acceleration, or
slope of the FCR, is the result of the relational movement of the two forces moving
toward the same location at this point in the battle. Madinah' s movement was necessary
to initiate ground combat with forces already at KKMC, thereby maintaining the
operational initiative.
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As Madinah begins to withdraw from contact at time 1.15, the FCR initially drops
off before stabilizing back to the gradual rise exhibited in the first few hours of the
scenario. At this point in the battle Madinah begins to lose its momentum, and the
unimpeded 2/24th Mech closes and joins battle at approximately time 1.5. For the next
twelve hours, the Coalition force is able to create a favorable tempo, but has arrived well
after the Iraqi force was able to withdraw. Though creating a favorable FCR from time
1 .5 to 2.0, it is occurring at the expense of pursuing an enemy with whom they still have
not gained contact. Finally, at the beginning of the second day, Madinah continues its
withdrawal uninhibited by Coalition efforts. The curve characteristics at this point are
useful to a CINC in evaluating the exercise. The defeated Iraqi force is able to reduce the
FCR. This translates to an inability to prevent a force from escaping the battle area. If
this were intentional, then the curve is simply an affirmation that the plan was properly
conducted. If not, this analysis portrays the inability of the 24th Mech to maintain the
tempo and create a favorable FCR with respect to the Iraqi forces.
The Madinah Division executes the withdrawal along with the Hammurabi
Division. The movement is from the KKMC area of operations to support forces along
the coast. Given the lateral movement of the Iraqi forces, a successful counterattack plan
would have slowed the withdrawal.
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Figure 11. Effects of Interdiction on Closure.
The "decision tree" for Event One, the Madinah withdrawal, is shown in Figure
12. To answer the previously mentioned question of why the Madinah Division was
allowed to withdraw unimpeded, the possible broad categories of causes must be
delineated. Was it due to poor intelligence, 2/24th Mech's lack of mobility, a supply
shortfall, low force strength, prior tasking of 2/24th Mech, or was this sequence of events
a result of Coalition operational tactics?
Did this critical event occur because of an operational tactical decision? This
is the first of Critical Event One's branches, and it quickly ends. If not following Madinah
was a tactic that was decided upon by the Coalition chain of command, subjective audit
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Figure 12. Event one causal audit trail decision tree.
Did 2 24th Mech have any prior tasking that would somehow impede their
pursuit of Madinah? In order to investigate this question, the 2/24th Mech's mission
and posture data during the period leading up to Madinah' s withdrawal must be analyzed.
Every unit in JTLS has both a mission and a posture. "The mission is generally the last
thing the unit was ordered to do. The posture describes what the unit is actually doing
[Ref. 12]." This information is available in chronological order in 2/24th Mech's Unit
Change List (Table 4), which shows that 2/24th Mech is in a MOVING posture from day
0.5526 to 0.6648, when it shifts to a DEFEND posture, then back to MOVING at 1.0013.
It then briefly shifts back to DEFEND at day 1 . 1 169 until 1 .5007. A unit's posture
changes from MOVING to DEFEND when the unit's movement is complete or the unit
comes under fire [Ref. 12]. Since 2/24th Mech is not in combat at any time, this change in
posture at 1 . 1 169 is due to its arriving at its objective at KKMC. A unit will assume an
42

ATTACK posture only in response to a player order [Ref. 12]. This is the case with














.5526 MOVING NO ATTACK NO
.6648 DEFEND ATTACK NO
.9167 DEFEND DEFEND YES
4
1.0013 MOVING ATTACK YES Start of
Madinah's
Withdrawal.
1.0016 MOVING WITHDRAW YES
1.1169 DEFEND WITHDRAW YES
1.5007 ATTACK WITHDRAW NO
ir ir
' ' T
Table 4. Summary of Postures for 2/24th Mech and Madinah.
player issued order to attack the withdrawing Madinah division. These observations tell
the analyst that 2/24th Mech had the correct mission and posture to follow Madinah,
eliminating this as a possible cause for the critical event.
Continuing the investigation of "prior tasking," the next logical issue is to
determine whether any other Coalition ground units in the area could have performed the
mission of following Madinah. To do this, the postprocessor must report which other
Coalition units with similar functions were within a 100x100 mile square of Madinah when
it began to withdraw at day 1.0016. These results are seen in Table 5. Of the six
Unit Name Unit Type Latitude Longitude.
10MXINBD GROUND 27.6593833 45.6553501
10SUPBN DEPOT 27.6666667 45.6666667
1ARDIV.UK GROUND 27.15 45.65
1DSBN DEPOT 27.0666667 45.6333333
2DSBN DEPOT 27.3 45.6333333
2INDIV.UK GROUND 27.3833333 45.65
Table 5. Coalition units < 100 miles of Madinah at the time of their withdrawal.
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(Toalition units in the vicinity
,
only three are the proper type of ground unit that could
have performed this mission. Continuing the audit trail, the next step is to report what
10MXINBD, 1 ARDIV.UK, and 2INDIV.UK were doing at the time of the MADINAH
withdrawal. These results are given in Table 6.
Clearly, 1ARDIV.UK and 2INDIV.UK are engaged in combat, making them
incapable of pursuing Madinah. This leaves 10MXINBD, a mixed infantry brigade, as the
only other possible candidate to pursue Madinah. From this point, the audit trail would
then follow the subjective path ofwhy 10MXTNBD was not assigned the mission of
helping 2/24th Mech to track down Madinah. Perhaps the Coalition chain of command
n~<
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Unit % Strength Posture Mission Direction In Combat?
10MXINBD 98.21 DEFEND DEFEND 1 NO
1ARDIV.UK 95.6 DEFEND DEFEND 1 YES
2INDIV.UK 90.31 DEFEND DEFEND 1 YES
Table 6. Status of Coalition ground units in vicinity of Madinah withdrawal.
assumed that 2/24th Mech, being the closest unit to Madinah, would be able to trail them
without assistance or that 10MXTNBD was more valuable to the Coalition cause in some
other capacity.
Was 2/24th Mech's force strength a factor in allowing Madinah to withdraw?
This question can be answered by analyzing the trends in 2/24th Mech's percent strength
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throughout the scenario. The 2/24th Mech's percent strength never falls below 99.45%
during the entire scenario, so it can be reasonably assumed that this factor played no role
in the scenario's outcome.
Continuing the analysis of 2/24th Mech's possible weaknesses, one can query the
status of 2/24th Mech's combat systems data. As seen in Table 7, the JTLS post-
processor can output when each unit's level of a particular combat system changed, the
reason for the change, and the new "level" of that combat system. After review of all of
the 2/24th Mech's combat systems, none are depleted; thus ending this branch of the
causal audit trail tree. If this analysis had revealed deficiencies in one or more combat




















Table 7. Sample of Combat System Change JTLS Postprocessor Table.
• The time of the damage.
• The unit change data associated with that particular time.
• The supporting force in the area.
• The quality of the unit's intelligence.
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t • The unit's detailed supply status.
Was the 2/24th Mech's supply status a factor in allowing Madinah to
withdraw? The type of analysis that was performed on the 2/24th Mech's combat
system data can be repeated for supply data to determine if a unit had deficiencies in any
of its Supply Categories (SC). As seen in the Supply Category Change (SCC) file (Table
8), the JTLS postprocessor can report the type of supply, the time its level changed, its
new value, and the reason it changed. As was evident with 2/24th Mech's combat system
changes, none of their supply categories were reasonably depleted at the time of
Madinah' s initial withdrawal. Had there been more variability in the levels of supplies, the











CL.I (SUBSISTENCE ITEMS) DUE IN INITIAL DATA
CL.I 0.001 REORDER 15.249 UNIT ATTACHED
CL.I 0.25 ON HAND 28.3953 CONSUMED
CL.I 0.5 ON HAND 26.9006 CONSUMED
CL.I 0.75 ON HAND 33.71914636 CONSUMED
CL.I 1 ON HAND 31.77689636 CONSUMED
CL.I.W (WATER) DUE IN INITIAL DATA
CL.I.W BASIC LOAD 4581 INITIAL DATA
CL.I.W 0.001 DUE IN UNIT ATTACHED
CL.I.W 0.001 BASIC LOAD 47947.8 UNIT ATTACHED
CL.I.W 0.001 ON HAND 151593 UNIT ATTACHED
CL.I.W 0.25 ON HAND 248542.2835 CONSUMED
CL.I.W 0.375 ON HAND 248480.104 COMBAT USAGE
CL.I.W 0.416 ON HAND 248417.9245 COMBAT USAGE
Table 8. Sample of Supply Category Change JTLS Post-processor Table.
supply type. For each apparent supply shortfall using these criteria, the following
information would be considered in the analysis:
• The status of available supply transportation.
• The availability of air cover for the associated transports.
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1
• The amount of the particular deficient supply category that is available in
theater
• The names and locations of other units or sites with this resource available
Was 2/24th Mech hampered by lack of mobility, somehow not allowing them
to follow Madinah? The first bit of information needed for this portion of the analysis is
the terrain type in the vicinity of both units. Throughout the entire scenario, Madinah and
2/24th Mech travel through hexes that belong to one of the three following categories:
open terrain, rubbled cities, or forests with good roads. All of these are considered to be
"minimally limiting terrain" by JTLS movement algorithms, so the factor of terrain type
can be eliminated as an important factor in the scenario's outcome.
Was allowing Madinah to withdraw a result of poor Coalition intelligence?
This branch of the decision tree would be essential in most scenarios, but due to the
composition of Coalition and opposing forces in this wargame, intelligence played an
almost nonexistent role in the Coalitions forces' detecting of Iraqi forces. The HUMINT
and ELINT assets available to the Coalition forces were not used, which was a conscious
decision on the part of the designers of the experiment. This artificiality was imposed for
the purpose of enhancing the quantity of ground combat available for analysis. Had
Coalition air forces been used, the possibility of opposing ground forces being quickly
eliminated seemed very likely.
The 2/24th Mech receives accurate updates of Madinah' s location whenever
Madinah's location changes and 2/24th Mech is within the range of its given sensors.
These sensors may be radars, intelligence sources, or in this case, visual. When not within
*
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sensor range of Madinah, 2/24th Mech perceives them to be at their last known location
(Figure 13). This figure shows the distance, in nautical miles, between Madinah' s actual
location and where 2/24th Mech perceives Madinah to be. As could be expected, the
graph follows the timeline of the scenario: after making steady movement toward KKMC
and staying close to Madinah early on the first day, 2/24th Mech was impeded by a
successful Iraqi air strike at 0.625 days. Damage was simulated and the resulting time of
repair induced further delays. The 2/24th Mech eventually reached KKMC and engaged
the Madinah Division in battle. Madinah then began to withdraw from contact at day
1 .0016 and endured a twelve hour conflict with the 2/24th Mech during their retreat.


















Figure 13. Difference between Madman's perceived and actual locations.
Of all possible branches of the causal audit trail tree, this is the most plausible. The
reason 2/24th Mech did not follow Madinah in its withdrawal was almost certainlv the fact
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tjjat they did not know where Madinah was. Once Madinah exceeded the range of 2/24th
Mech's sensors, there were no other Coalition forces close enough to find this elusive
Iraqi unit.
Similar analysis of the perception of force strength is shown in Figures 14 and 15
The 2/24th Mech maintains an accurate picture of Madinah's force strength until they
begin their withdrawal at Day 1.0016 where, due to the increased range, 2/24th Mech
slightly underestimates Madinah's force strength. This can also be attributed to the lack of
Coalition intelligence assets. The only Coalition asset available to assess the strength of




































Figure 15. Difference between perceived and actual strength vs. time.
Had the scenario included other intelligence related data, the following elements
would be essential for analysis of the critical event:
• Reports of all the organic intelligence data regarding Madinah forwarded
during the entire scenario and comparisons with the actual times of events to
determine the age of the information.
• Reports of which Coalition air recce assets were available and their tasking
during the period leading up to Madinah's withdrawal.
• Reports of all air recce intelligence data forwarded during the given period of
inquiry and comparisons with the actual times of events to determine the age of
the information.
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• Reports of all Coalition ELINT and HUMINT assets available during the given
period of inquiry and their tasking during the same period.
• Reports of all ELINT and HUMINT data forwarded during the given period of
inquiry and comparisons with the actual times of events to determine its
relevance.
Searching for the most likely cause of this critical event reveals that the "poor
intelligence" branch of the causal audit trail tree is the likely cause. Ignoring any potential
subjective decisions that may have affected this scenario, the Coalition forces' most
glaring Achilles' heel was their inability to track the enemy. This can be attributed almost
entirely to their complete lack of deployed intelligence assets.
D. EVENT ONE (A): 2/24TH MECH AIR STRIKE, THE IRAQI PERSPECTIVE
An interesting parallel to the audit trail of Event One is a similar analysis from an
Iraqi perspective. While trying to answer the question of how Iraqi forces are able to
locate and hit the 2/24th Mech with an air strike, some additional facts about the scenario
are revealed.
Due to information already known about this scenario from the analysis of Event
One, the causal audit trail decision tree of Event One (A) (Figure 16) is relatively small.




r Strike on the 2/24th Mech
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Figure 16. Event 1 (A) causal audit trail decision tree.
Was the strike successful due to superior Iraqi air forces? In trying to ensure a
successful Iraqi air strike, no Coalition air missions were flown in this variation of the
scenario. For the same reason, the ROE for all Coalition air defense units were configured
to allow no Coalition surface-to-air engagements with attacking Iraqi air forces. The
combination of these factor made the 2/24th Mech, once found, an easy target.
How were the Iraqi forces able to locate the 2/24th Mech? Contrary to the
lack of Coalition intelligence employed in this scenario, there was a limited amount Iraqi
intelligence that enabled their forces to locate Coalition units. The intelligence came in the
form of three Iraqi armed reconnaissance air missions flown during the scenario (Table 9).









2BDE24 281300 0.5321 26.45/48.62 NONE FOUND
2BDE24 281345 0.5630 26.45 / 48.62 NONE FOUND
2BDE24 ASAP 0.6050 26.83/46.82 2BDE24MX
Table 9. Summary of Iraqi Armed Reconnaissance Air Missions
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and engage any Coalition units they could find. Their area of patrol was explicitly input by
game developers to cover the 2/24th Mech's route to KKMC, hoping that at least one of
these missions would detect the 2/24th Mech, engage it, and delay their progress to their
objective. The third of the three missions did just that; launching at time 0.6060 then
detecting and hitting the 2/24th Mech with an air strike at time 0.6250. The desired
objective of the game controllers was to hit the 2/24th Mech with an air strike to evaluate
its effect on their pursuit of Madinah, and they made this happen by leaving the 2/24th
Mech essentially defenseless against air attack.
E. EVENT TWO: THE DAHRAHN AIR STRIKE
Figure 17 shows the causal audit trail decision tree for Critical Event Two, the
Dahrahn air strike.
Did poor intelligence contribute to the success of Iraq's air strike on
Dahrahn? As discussed in the previous analysis of the Madinah withdrawal, very limited
intelligence assets were played in this scenario. The following data elements would need
to be queried if the given scenario produced significant intelligence data:
• Reports all organic intelligence data regarding the opposing strike force
forwarded during the period leading up to the air strike and comparisons with
the actual times of events to determine the age of the information.
• Reports of all tasking of Coalition air recce, ELINT, and HUMTNT assets at




Causal Audit Trail: Dahrahn Air Strike






































Figure 17. Event 2 causal audit trail decision tree.
Reports of all air recce intelligence, ELINT, and HUMINT data forwarded during the
given period of inquiry, with comparisons to the actual times of events to determine
the lateness of the data.
Reports indicating if intelligence regarding the launch of the opposing strike aircraft
was forwarded.
Reports of the results ofCAP missions, if they were called in.
Reports indicating if any intelligence regarding the location of the opposing strike
force home airfield was ever forwarded.
Reports indicating if the given airfield was ever targeted by Coalition strike missions.
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1 Did poor air defense or a lack of air defense contribute to Iraq's success in
carrying out the air strike on the port of Dahrahn? This question is answered by
analyzing the composition of the Coalition units in the vicinity of Dahrahn during the air
strike. To do this, the postprocessor must report all Coalition units with air defense
capabilities within 50 miles during the air attack. Table 10 lists all of the Coalition units
within a 100x100 mile box surrounding Dahrahn. Once this information is known, the
analyst must then determine the composition of each unit to determine whether it has air
defense capabilities. To do this, one must query the database available in the JTLS On-
line Player's Manual (OPM). Among other things, the OPM lists each unit's SAM/AAA
UNIT TYPE UNIT TYPE UNIT TYPE
1-11FABN GROUND 2-9FABN GROUND D-3-41FAB GROUND
1-2ADBN GROUND 24DIVARTY GROUND HQ2BDE101 GROUND
1-5INBN GROUND 2ARBDE1AR GROUND XVI 1 1FA GROUND
1-8ARBN GROUND 3-2ADABN GROUND 18COSCOMR DEPOT
1-9FABN GROUND 3-41 FABN GROUND 1DISC0MR DEPOT
11FABDE18 GROUND 3-9FABN GROUND 1-229ATKH SQDRON
1ARBDE1AR GROUND 3ARBDE1AR GROUND 2-159ATKH SQDRON
1BDE24MX GROUND 3ARCAVRGT GROUND 229ATKGP SQDRON
2-11FABN GROUND D-1-2ADBN GROUND
2-12ARRGT GROUND D-24DIVAR GROUND
Table 10. Coalition Units within 100 x 100 box of the Port of Dahrahn.
targets, such as Stinger batteries, Patriot batteries, etc. Table 1 1 lists those units with air
defense capabilities and shows that these four units had the weapons necessary for an
Unit Name Air Defense Assets
1-2ADABN 2 Stingers with 1 1 Firing elements each
1ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
2ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
3ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
HQ2BDE101 2 Stingers with 1 1 Firing elements each
Table 11. Air Defense Units near Dahrahn.
attempted defense of the port of Dahrahn from the opposing strike force.
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' What were these units doing during the period leading up to the air strike?
The answers to this question can be seen by reviewing the unit change list for each unit,
as shown in Table 12. This table indicates that none of the air defense units in the vicinity
of the port of Dahrahn were in combat during the entire scenario. A scan of the
postprocessor's air engagement file reveals that there were no Coalition SAM
engagements during the entire scenario. The reason for these unusual circumstances is
Unit Name Time Posture Mission Strength In Combat? Orientation






1ARBDE1AR 1.5001 DEFEND DEFEND 99.63 NO 1
2 DEFEND DEFEND 99.56 NO 1
2 DEFEND DEFEND 99.52 NO 1
2 DEFEND DEFEND 99.51 NO 1





2ARBDE1AR 1.5001 DEFEND DEFEND 99.63 NO 1





3ARBDE1AR 1.5001 DEFEND DEFEND 99.53 NO 1











Table 12. Unit Change List For Dahrahn Air Defense Units.
that the game controllers did not allow SAM engagements to ensure that the port of
Dahrahn sustained damage. This was done in order to perform analysis on the Coalition
forces' ability to overcome a successful air strike on their main port of entry into the
theater To alter the scenario in such a manner, Coalition ROE were changed so that air
defense units would not engage any potential targets.
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R EVENT THREE: IRANIAN CVBG RAID
The "decision tree" for Critical Event Three, the naval attack, is shown in Figure
18. Since Coalition offensive counter-air operations were not scripted into this scenario,
which other factors caused the CVBG to suffer such a devastating blow at the hands of
the Iranian air and naval forces9 Was it due to poor intelligence, lack of defensive
capability, or to a supply or equipment shortfall? Offensive counter-air
Was the success of the Iranian CVBG raid due to poor Coalition air defense?
Which CVBG units had air defense capabilities? What was the status of all their air
defense assets? The Carrier Battle Group, comprised of Aegis cruisers, destroyers and
frigates amassed a formidable air defense capability. At the start of the exercise, all units
were at full strength and full supply compliment. The CVBG was on alert along a threat
sector which included the likely avenues of approach from Busher, Shiraz, Esfahan and
Kharg Island. The three CAP stations were active, and the entire carrier air wing was at
its highest state of readiness.
Report status of CVBG air search radars All units' air search radars were
operational with no reported deficiencies.
Was poor intelligence a factor in the success of the Iranian CVBG raid?
Report if a change in threat perception occurred from initial classification. At the
commencement of the exercise, the Iranians were already declared "hostile". The
locations of the air bases at Busher and Shiraz were known, as were the locations of naval
and SAM assets in the Iranian arsenal.
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Causal Audit Trail: CVBG Attack
























































Figure 18. Event 3 causal audit trail decision tree.
Report all organic intelligence data regarding Iranian forces forwarded
during period of inquiry. The given scenario as implemented did not employ the
available intelligence collection capabilities. Had the ability to deploy and receive data
from intelligence assets been used in this scenario, the following queries could have been
made:
Reports of the tasking of all Coalition air recce, ELINT, and HUMINT assets
at the time of the attack.
Reports of all air recce intelligence, ELINT, and HUMINT data forwarded
during the given period leading up to the Iranian CVBG raid, with comparisons
with the actual times of events to determine the time lateness of the data.
Reports indicating ifany intelligence regarding the launch of the Iranian strike
aircraft was forwarded.
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• Reports indicating if any intelligence regarding the location or movement of
Iranian naval forces was forwarded.
• Reports indicating if resupply, refueling or force buildup was reported by
Coalition reconnaissance missions.
• Reports indicating if any Iranian reconnaissance missions were flown from the
air bases.
Information available to the analyst can be combined into engagement reports.
These reports enable the analyst to "see" the following: the time of engagement, the type
of weapon fired, who is firing and who is being fired upon. Reports can be further
subdivided to concentrate on air-to-air, surface-to-surface or air defense pictures. From
such a collection of data, the frequency and range of fire, destruction of platforms and the
tactics of both sides can be inferred.
Table 13 depicts a section of the SURFACE-TO-SURFACE ENGAGEMENT
REPORT. Engagements are sequential and take place in a period of less than three hours.
Conflict is initiated by Iranian surface vessels. The attack destroys two of the three CAP
stations. Repeated waves of aircraft from Busher and Shiraz coordinate their missile
launches so that the arrival of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) is simultaneous with the
arrival of shore based missiles, which are successful in not only disabling the carrier, but
also completely destroying both cruisers.
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Firer Engagement Weapon Successful impacts Target
PATRON AIR_MISSION HARPOON 7 CVN-71
DD-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-22 1 CG-69
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 1 CG-53
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 1 CG-53
FITRON. AIR_MISSION ROCKETS 76 CVN-71
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 1 CVN-71
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 1 CVN-71
KHARG MISSILE SS-N-22 1 CG-53
BUSHER. MISSILE SCUD 1 AOR-7
BUSHER. MISSILE SCUD 1 FFG-38
FARON1. AIR_MISSION AS4 4 CVN-71
FARON2. AIR_MISSION HARPOON 2 CG-69
HAKRON AIR_MISSION AS4 2 CG-69
FARON2. AIR_MISSION HARPOON 1 CVN-71
FARON1. AIR_MISSION AS4 4 CG-53
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 CG-53
CG-IRAN MISSILE SS-N-19 CVN-71
KHARG MISSILE SS-N-22 CG-53
BUSHER. MISSILE SCUD AOR-7
BUSHER. MISSILE SCUD AE-29
Table 13. Surface to Surface Engagement Report.
Figure 19 provides a snapshot of the coordinated enemy air assets attacking the
CVBG. Damage to the carrier significantly hinders the ability to launch and recover
aircraft, thereby removing medium and long range AAW. Without CAP and defensive
counter air (DCA), the destruction of the cruisers was imminent. Land-based air forces
(both USMC and USAF) were available, but not used in this scenario. This, like other
artificialities, was part of the experimental design. Each cruiser was able to sustain an
initial wave of missile and aircraft attacks with moderate damage but could not defend
against subsequent raids after sustaining initial damage. Though the simulation ends at
this point, it is safe to assume that the remaining non-AAW assets would soon fall prey to





















Figure 19. Scenario Action, Critical Events 3 and 3(A).
While the previous analysis focused primarily on the CVBG engagement data,
there are many more parameters available for the study in the AAW performance of a
battle group. The product of each unit's strength and the unit's AAW capability factor
yields the battle group's cumulative AAW strength as a function of time. The AAW
strength factors used for the analysis in this thesis are provided in Appendix B. Though
not a stand-alone measure for AAW performance, the AAW strength can provide the
causal audit trail of events leading to the destruction of the CVBG. For example, should a
primary AAW asset be completely destroyed, the overall AAW capability of the battle
group will be severely diminished and the subsequent destruction of additional assets
would be more likely
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The AAW strength of the CVBG initial index value is the sum of all products of
CVBG assets and their AAW strength factor. Figure 20 provides the strength measures
over time
Initial degradation is a result of the initiation of conflict, during which the Iranian
surface patrol craft shot down the CAP aircraft The carrier was subjected to only two
waves of missile attacks, with the second wave providing the final destructive blow With
the destruction of the carrier also comes the removal of her air wing, most of which were
able to fly off prior to the sinking of the ship. Regardless, the wing was now unable to
provide sufficient CAP or DCA aircraft during the height of the attack, thereby weakening
the overall CVBG strength proportionally With the loss of the carrier and the cruisers,
eighty per cent of the total AAW capability of the CVBG was lost.












4.48:00 5:16:48 5:45:36 6:14:24 6:43:12 7:12:00 7:40:48 8:09:36 8:38:24
Time
ngure 20. Time-Correlated AAW Strength Measure.
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Only fourteen percent of Iranian aircraft were destroyed, while only twenty five
percent of Iranian missiles were intercepted by the CVBG, but why? Supply shortages do
not appear to be linked to the devastating blow to the CVBG. The lack of Coalition
intelligence gathering capabilities could have been a contributing factor. It was the sheer
number of enemy units, both air and missile threats, combined with lack of availability of
Coalition air assets, that were the primary factors in causing the swift degradation of the
CVBG's ability to fight.
The degradation of CAP aircraft and the destruction ofCG assets decreased the
number of Iranian aircraft engagements. Concentration of resources then shifted from air
engagements to missile engagements. Figure 21 provides a graphical representation of the
CVBG's ability to execute defense-in-depth. Defense-in-depth provides for engagements
by long range weapons (CAP aircraft) initially, followed by medium range weapons
(Surface-to-Air Missile (SAMs)), then by short range weapons (Basic Point Defense
Missile System (BPDMS)) and finally the Phalanx Close-in-Weapon Systems (CIWS) to
cover the entire range of the flight profile to a High Value Unit (HVU). This layered
defense approach provides the maximum number of potential weapons on the threat
during the course of its flight, maximizes the overall kill probability and reduces the
likelihood of the enemy countering all defensive systems with a single weapon system.
Ideally, the enemy aircraft will be destroyed at the minimum of either the identification or
effective weapons range.
All engagements in this case are SAM engagements, due to the initial loss of the
CAP aircraft. The greatest value of this graph is that of determining, due to the
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sCarcity of aircraft engagements, that a concentration of effort was expended not on
engaging aircraft, but instead on engaging missiles. This serves as an immediate flag to

























Figure 21. CVBG Enemy Aircraft Engagement.
the breakdown of the defense-in-depth concept because the number of aircraft
engagements, given the magnitude of the total number of incoming aircraft in this
scenario, should be significant. The CVBG loss ofCAP and reduction in DCA resulted in
a change in tactics from destruction of the "archer" to the more difficult destruction of the
"arrows."
G. EVENT THREE (A): CVBG RAID, IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE
Analysis of Event Three from the threat perspective answers the question of how
the Iranians were able to locate the Coalition CVBG. Figure 22 shows the causal audit
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trail decision tree for Critical Event Three (A), the Iranian raid on the Coalition CVBG,
from the Iranian perspective.
Iranian
Causal Audit Trail:
Location of Coalition CVBG













Figure 22. Causal Audit Trail Decision Tree for Critical Event 3(a).
Were the radars at the Iranian air bases of Esfahan and Shiraz fully
operational at the time of detection of the Coalition CVBG? Shiraz and Esfahan were
not equipped with surface search radars, but their air search radars were fully operational.
At no time during the scenario did either of these radars provide initial detection
information dealing with any Coalition air tracks.
Were Iranian naval assets deployed to assist in locating the Coalition CVBG?
An Iranian cruiser and destroyer, both with operational air and surface search radars, were
steaming in the Persian Gulf region, but they were not the initial sources of detection of
any Coalition air or surface tracks.
Were Iranian air assets deployed to assist in locating the Coalition CVBG?
The Iranian air forces were thoroughly patrolling the entire gulf region. The number of
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Iranian detections of Coalition naval units shows that the CVBG's location was clearly
known to the Iranian forces early in the scenario.
The sources of the Iranian detections of Coalition naval units are, in this case,













0.01 FFG-59 IRAN 0.02 FFG-38 IRAN
0.01 AE-29 IRAN 0.03 AOR-7 IRAN
0.01 CVN-71 IRAN 0.04 VA-36 IRAN
0.01 DD-966 IRAN 0.04 VF-84 IRAN
0.01 CG-53 IRAN 0.05 SSN-717 IRAN
0.02 SSN-714 IRAN 0.08 DD-982 IRAN
0.02 VF-154 IRAN 0.08 VFA-195 IRAN
Table 14. Summary of Iranian Patrol Detections of Coalition Units.
detection algorithms inherent in JTLS. The first sensor to detect a given unit within a hex
is registered as the "detecting unit" regardless of subsequent detections by other units.
This explains the lack of detections attributed to the Iranian land-based and naval assets.
The scenarios discussed in this chapter were constrained to facilitate UJTL analysis
across several functional areas. The methodology presented in this thesis was later applied
to less constrained JTLS runs described in Chapter V. These runs provide a more realistic
basis for applying the audit trail methodology.
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' V. RESULTS OF JTLS 2.1 DEMONSTRATION SCENARIO
A. SCENARIO BACKGROUND
The basic scenario used for the JTLS 2. 1 demonstration is nearly identical to the
variants of the heavy scenario described in Chapter III. The force composition of both
sides and the initial "script" of the scenarios were similar, but the execution of the
wargame differed in the following ways:
• Coalition air forces were utilized to the fullest possible extent.
• Coalition forces were heavily involved in intelligence operations.
• Scenario ROE were configured such that Coalition forces would be allowed to
conduct air defense operations.
• The outcome of the wargame was heavily dependent on the players. The
leadership of the Coalition forces was made up of a collection of fifteen junior
military officers (novice gamers with aggressive tactics) who participated in the
exercise as a requirement for a graduate level wargaming course at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
• Game controllers were R&A personnel, who also doubled as the Iraqi and
Iranian military leadership.
As could be predicted, the combination of these factors led to drastically different results.
The runs discussed in Chapters III and IV (hereafter referred to as the UJTL scenario)
were very controlled scenarios designed to produce results suitable for analysis of specific
UJTL mission areas. The JTLS 2. 1 scenario wargame was played in a, free play mode to
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meet the objective of familiarizing junior officers with wargaming principles and JTLS.
Accordingly, students operated with few restrictions placed on their playing styles and
tactics. However, the same analysis methodology can still be applied.
B. CRITICAL EVENT SELECTION
To demonstrate the differences in the outcomes of the JTLS 2. 1 and UJTL
scenarios, corresponding "parallel" critical events are analyzed in later sections.
Critical Event One (B) is a variation of Critical Event One discussed in Chapters
III and IV. The Madinah Division was not allowed to accomplish an unimpeded
withdrawal in this scenario. The Madinah, along with three accompanying Iraqi units, is
surrounded and defeated by a larger coalition contingent of ground forces (Figures 23 and
24). Why were the coalition forces able to track down and annihilate the Madinah
Division and its accompanying Iraqi forces?
Critical Event Two (B) is a variation of Critical Event Two discussed in Chapters
III and IV. The port of Dahrahn fell victim to Iraqi air strikes in the UJTL scenario,
causing lengthy delays of forces and supplies entering the theater. The air strike in the
JTLS 2. 1 scenario also resulted in damage to the port, but Coalition air defense and
Coalition air forces were active in the JTLS 2. 1 scenario. Why was the Iraqi air strike
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Figure 24. Force Locations at time 0.479.
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<*. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL EVENT ONE (B): THE MADINAH DEFEAT
The downfall of the Madinah Division is clearly evident in their unit change list
















0.063 COMBAT DEFEND 99.472 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.375 COMBAT DEFEND 99.079 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.417 COMBAT DEFEND 84.922 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.458 COMBAT WITHDRAW 77.474 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.500 COMBAT WITHDRAW 63.774 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.542 COMBAT WITHDRAW 59.813 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.583 COMBAT WITHDRAW 56.588 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.625 COMBAT WITHDRAW 53.73 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.667 COMBAT WITHDRAW 51.000 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.708 COMBAT WITHDRAW 48.335 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.750 COMBAT WITHDRAW 46.022 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.792 COMBAT WITHDRAW 43.859 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.833 COMBAT WITHDRAW 41.735 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.875 COMBAT WITHDRAW 39.651 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.917 COMBAT WITHDRAW 37.137 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
0.958 COMBAT WITHDRAW 34.101 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.000 COMBAT WITHDRAW 31.087 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.020 COMBAT WITHDRAW 31.087 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.040 COMBAT WITHDRAW 28.213 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.080 COMBAT WITHDRAW 22.997 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.130 COMBAT WITHDRAW 20.506 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.170 COMBAT INCAPABLE 18.117 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.210 COMBAT INCAPABLE 15.837 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
1.250 COMBAT INCAPABLE 11.172 28.25 46.283 28.25 46.28
Table 15. Unit Change List for the Madinah Division.
The rapidly declining force strength can also be seen in Figure 25. At time 0.417,
the Madinah is hit with the initial surge of Coalition fire. The causal audit trail decision
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Figure 25. Madinah's Strength vs. Time
tree for Critical Event One (B) is shown in Figure 26.

























Available to come to
their Defense?
Figure 26. Event One (B) causal audit trail decision tree.
Was the Madinah Division defeated due to a superior Coalition intelligence
effort? The answer to this question is evident in Table 15, which shows that Madinah's
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location and the Coalition perception of their location were identical throughout the entire
scenario. The Madinah's proximity to Coalition ground forces did not allow it to avoid
detection by Coalition forces.
Was the Madinah defeated due to a lack of Iraqi support? Considering the
force composition of both sides at the beginning of Madinah's defeat at time 0.417 (Table

















17ARDIV 28.267 YES 1ARCAV 21.496 YES
HAMMURABI 13.252 YES 1ARDIV.UK 16.973 YES
RGFCFA.IQ 7.348 YES 1ARRGT 15.986 YES










Table 16. Units in vicinity of Madinah at time 0.417.
a result of the aggressive tactics used by wargaming personnel. Their decisions affecting
the positioning and posturing of the Coalition forces resulted in total defeat of the Iraqi
forces due the velocity and quantity of forces sent to oppose them.
Was Madinah defeated due to an Iraqi or Coalition operational tactic? This
question was answered in the previous paragraph. The positioning and posturing of the
coalition forces due to player interaction were key elements in the Iraqi forces' defeat.
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What caused players to make these tactical decisions9 These actions were due to a
combination of
• The accurate location information of the Iraqi forces available to Coalition
leaders.
• Various human factors that influenced the tactical decision process.
Was the Madinah defeated due to a lack of mobility or a lack of supplies? A
review of the Madinah Division supply category change list revealed that no supplies were
significantly depleted during the period leading up to the beginning of Madinah' s defeat.
Madinah' s mobility was not constrained by terrain or environmental effects.
The causal audit trail revealed the Madinah Division's defeat was caused by a
combination of 1) superior Coalition intelligence dealing with the Madinah Division
location and 2) the aggressive operational tactics input through player interaction.
D. ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL EVENT TWO (B): THE DAHRAHN AIR STRIKE
Figure 27 depicts the causal audit trail decision tree for Critical Event Two (B),
the Dahrahn Air Strike.
Was the air strike on the port of Dahrahn successful due to poor Coalition
Air Defense? In this scenario, Coalition ROE were configured so that air defense
engagements of Iraqi units could happen, and they did. However, of the eight aircraft in
the four missions that flew air to ground attacks against targets in the port of Dahrahn,
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Causa 1 Audit Trail: Dahrahn A ir Stri ke






































Figure 27. Event Two (B) Causal Audit Trail Decision Tree.
only one was shot down by Coalition air defense units (Tables 17 and 18).
Why was only one shot down? The audit trail prompts the analyst to next consider
how many air defense units were in the area to determine why more air defense











0.250 DHA-1 ATTACK 1AVN.RGT 2 MIG27-D 26.40 50.02
0.250 DHA-2 ATTACK 1AVN.RGT 2 MIG27-D 26.40 50.02
0.563 DHA-3 ATTACK 1AVN.RGT 2 MIG27-D 26.40 50.02
0.563 DHA-4 ATTACK 1AVN.RGT 2 MIG27-D 26.40 50.02














0.542 HAWK-SA8 HAWK 2 DHA-2 1 17.02
Table 18. Summary of Coalition Air Defense Engagements.
air defense units in a 100 by 100 mile box surrounding Dahrahn are shown in Table 19 In
this scenario, these units are not players in Dahrahn' s air defense because they are all
located nearly 60 miles to the northwest. The port of Dahrahn is represented by the unit
Unit Name Air Defense Assets
1-2ADABN 2 Stingers with 1 1 Firing elements each
3-2ADABN 2 Stingers with 1 1 Firing elements each
1ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
2ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
3ARBDE1AR 1 Patriot battery with 6 Firing elements
HQ1BDE101 2 Stingers with 11 Firing elements each
HQ2BDE101 2 Stingers with 11 Firing elements each
HQ3BDE101 2 Stingers with 11 Firing elements each
Table 19. Air Defense Units near Dahrahn.
DHARPORT in JTLS. DHARPORT is a Coalition unit with two Hawk sites under its
control, HAWK-SA7 west of Dahrahn and HAWK-SA8 in Dahrahn. Table 20 describes
the capabilities of a Hawk missile site in this JTLS scenario. A Hawk site is limited in
range to a best case maximum of 40 KM. Given that the attacks on Dahrahn came in two
waves of four planes each, it is a reasonable outcome for only one air defense engagement
to occur. The HAWK-SA8 site shot two missiles at the first wave of Iraqi aircraft:
missions DHA-1 and DHA-2. One of the four aircraft was shot down, one missile missed,
and the site was suppressed for the remainder of the attack. The second wave of aircraft,
missions DHA-3 and DHA-4, were not detected by either Hawk site.
75
1 Was the port of Dahrahn hit due to a lack of intelligence? A review of
Coalition intelligence reports shows that Coalition forces were never alerted when any of
the four attack missions against Dahrahn were launched. Consideration of the intelligence
assets utilized by the Coalition leadership shows a strong concentration of air forces near
KKMC, but none near Dahrahn. Due to the inexperience of the players with the
mechanics of creating CAP stations, they were not activated until early on Day Two, well
after the Dahrahn air strike. This delay resulted in a lack of assets to perform air-to-air
engagements on the incoming Dahrahn air strike missions. Analysis of the scenario's air-
to-air engagement table confirms that there were many Iraqi missions targeted by
Coalition air forces, but none of them were the missions headed for Dahrahn.
Maximum Engagement Ranges:






A/C Type Engagement Probabilities:




Misc. Air Defense Characteristics:
Number of Simultaneous Engagements 2
Suppression Time 0.499 Hours
Reload Time 0.5 Hours
Total Shots 18
Shots per Load 9
Shots per Engagement 2
Shots before Reload 9
Table 20. Air Defense Characteristics of a Hawk Site.
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1 In summary, the causal audit trail revealed that the Dahrahn air strike was
successful for the following reasons:
• The limited number and capabilities of Dahrahn' s organic air defense sites.
• A lack of Coalition CAP assets in the vicinity of the Dahrahn, primarily due to
a lack of player experience. Note that this is one case where player actions (or
interactions) are directly observable for audit trail analysis.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"Out of intense complexities, intense simplicities emerge." - Winston Churchill
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis presents a methodology for specifying and evaluating the causal factors
defining computer aided exercise critical events. The methodology developed is
uncomplicated, yet robust enough to be applicable to a variety of warfare areas, regardless
of scenario. The methodology is comprised of two significant elements. The first is the
identification of a scenario '$, potential critical events and the determination of their
possible causes at many different "levels of influence." The second is the development of
the data extraction procedures necessary for manipulation of raw output into user-friendly,
objective tables.
The methodology does not seek to assign values to each individual joint task stated
in the UJTL, but instead determines how the outcomes of significant events were
impacted by the mix of forces present in theater and their location relative to the enemy at
the time the events took place. Although tested exclusively in JTLS, the methodology
uses data readily accessible from other event step simulation models.
An important limitation to such analysis is that each simulation represents one
possible outcome based upon randomness introduced both by the stochastic simulation
and human interactions. Every player has some sort of decision making process that is
evoked before actions are taken. The same is true for participants in a CAX. Every time
a decision is made, a player analyzes competing alternatives and chooses the one he deems
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most appropriate. Due to the artificialities inherent in the exercise environment, CAXs
cannot be the only measure of the capabilities of a CINC's staff, even though they provide
valuable data and training,
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis must be viewed as part of the overall effort to assist in evaluating the
performance of a Joint Staff. Along with the theses mentioned in Chapter II, this thesis
provides the baseline for future efforts to develop a standard methodology for evaluating
Joint Staff performance. Standardized methods for evaluating the decision making
process of a Joint Staff will provide a causal audit trail for success or failure and further
enrich the training benefits available to a Joint Staff during a CAX.
At present, to create the causal audit trail described in this thesis, the analyst must
first access the critical event. Next, he or she must assemble simulation files, sort them
and extract necessary data. Finally, the analyst must create the necessary tables to
perform analysis. Involvement of the training audience (that will ultimately be the
beneficiary of this methodology) at all steps of the process is essential.
For example, if a wargame is being run to focus on a staffs performance regarding
logistics, several pre-made checklists and decision trees could be available (perhaps in a
window driven, pull-down menu environment) and ready for analysis of logistics specific
potential critical events. These accessories could be available for any potential mission
area on which a wargame intends to focus. Automation of this function will also allow for
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time which would otherwise be spent developing the mechanics of the causal audit trail to
be devoted to more in-depth analysis.
Another potential application of the developed methodology is that it could be
employed as a training tool or decision aid during the actual exercise. Once technology is
developed to analyze trends in a scenario and view the causes of critical events while the
scenario is being played, the performance of wargaming personnel should be significantly
enhanced.
The query/analysis capabilities that have been introduced support the development
of doctrine evaluation. As the pieces of the audit trail are revealed, the analyst is able to
recreate the events which led to a critical event. The ability to rerun the scenario in JTLS




APPENDIX A. JTLS 2.0 JMET OUTPUT FILE CONTENT















































The format for a ground mission's engagement data is given below. The format of
the engagementdata file changes with the different types of engagements, i.e. artillery
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APPENDIX B. AAW STRENGTH FACTORS FOR CVBG ASSETS
The following matrix represents the AAW strength factors used to calculate the
CVBG overall AAW strength index. The strength factor is similar to a firepower score
for a specific mission (in this case, AAW) when applied as a product with the individual
asset strength value. For this scenario, the aircraft carrier and Aegis cruisers are not only
HVUs, but are clearly the most heavily weighted AAW assets. To examine other mission
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